In this paper, we examine the value of politically connected outside directors (PCODs) in Korea. To shed light on the debate surrounding the value of having PCODs join boards, we manually collect and construct a large sample of PCODs in Korean Chaebol firms. Broadly consistent with Goldman et al. (2009), we find some evidence that the number of PCODs are positively correlated with firm performance, proxied by Tobin's Q and ROA. Furthermore, we find that the value effect of PCODs increases with the importance of internal trade among group affiliates, the existence of inside directorship by controlling shareholders, and a potential amount of settlement from pending litigation. We further differentiate among PCODs and find that former government officials as PCODs drive the findings above. On the other hand, we find evidence of weak monitoring ability of PCODs, in which the number of PCODs in a firm is negatively correlated with pay-for-performance sensitivity for inside executive directors, while we find no evidence that PCODs are associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an important internal corporate governance mechanism, the board of directors is expected to provide both advisory and monitoring functions. While an extensive body of prior research has investigated the impact of boards' structural features, such as size and independence, on their ability to monitor and advise the firm, recent studies suggest that political connections the board provides could be another way in which boards can increase firm value (Goldman et al. 2009 (Goldman et al. , 2011 . Political connections are valuable to firms since they could facilitate access to resources for financing and operating activities (Fisman 2001; Faccio 2006) .
In this paper, we examine politically connected outside directors (hereafter PCODs) in Korea, defined as independent directors who hold or held a position of judge, prosecutor, government official, member of the congress, journalist, and social activist. Adding a politically connected outside director to the board could be beneficial since the director can help secure government contracts or improve relationships with regulators (Goldman et al. 2009 (Goldman et al. , 2011 .
Most prior studies on the value of political connections, however, focus on political connections of controlling shareholders and top management (Fisman 2001; Faccio 2006; Faccio et al. 2006; Fan et al. 2007; Claessens et al. 2008 ) using proxies for firms' large shareholders and CEOs' close relationship with a ruling political party and firm-level campaign contribution data.
We instead focus on PCODs since the value of PCOD's political connections is ambiguous for several reasons. First, PCODs do not manage their firms and are usually compensated by fixed pay. Thus, they may have less incentive to use their professional network or knowledge to increase firm value. Second, PCODs' political connections may not translate into higher firm value if they simply help controlling shareholders and top management enjoy higher private benefit of controls. Third, while PCODs could enhance firm value through their political connections, they can be less effective monitors due to lack of professional expertise and business experience. Taken together, these ambiguous roles of PCODs in firm value creation make our attempt to investigate the value impact of PCODs more interesting.
To shed light on the debate surrounding the value of appointing PCODs, we manually collect and construct a large sample of PCODs in Korean Chaebol firms. Korean Chaebol firms provide an ideal setting to study the performance effects of PCODs. There is a large body of literature on causes and consequences of Korean business groups (Chaebol), (Claessens et al. 2000; Joh 2003; Baek et al. 2006; Almeida et al. 2011; Byun et al. 2013) . In Chaebol firms, the founding family is able to exert control over all subsidiaries of a business group through an indirect pyramidal ownership and (a) circular holdings structure (La Porta et al. 1999; Almeida et al. 2011) . Their ownership structure suggests that political connections could facilitate rentseeking.
More importantly, since the Asian financial crisis, regulators in the Korean government have taken an active governance role by issuing a series of governance reforms to regulate rentseeking by controlling shareholders in Chaebol firms. Coupled with potentially higher private benefits of control by controlling shareholders in Korean Chaebol firms, this active government involvement in curbing controlling shareholders' rent extraction in Chaebol firms provides us with a powerful setting to examine the roles and effects of PCODs.
Moreover, we define political connections more broadly compared to prior research, which focus exclusively on connections to political parties. Building on the literature on boards from the resource dependence theory perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Lester el al. 2008) , we argue that the resources PCODs bring to boards are significantly related to their human and social capital (Lester et al. 2008) . Consequently, our focus is to examine the circumstances under which the value effect of PCODs is more or less pronounced, rather than to document unambiguous evidence of a positive value effect of PCODs on average. By doing so, we can shed light on factors that make PCODs more or less attractive as a director than non-PCODs (Lester et al. 2008; Wang 2015) .
Broadly consistent with Goldman et al. (2009) , who document a positive stock price reaction following the announcement of the nomination of a politically connected board member, we find some evidence that the number of PCODs are positively correlated with firm performance, proxied by Tobin's Q and ROA. We also find that firms with at least one PCOD exhibit a significantly higher ROA. We further address potential endogeneity problems by estimating a firm-fixed effects model and a propensity-score matching method, and confirm that our findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity of PCODs on boards.
Next, we identify three firm characteristics that could make PCODs such as former government officials more valuable. Since Korean Chaebol firms frequently engage in related party transactions, often leading to unfair intercompany transaction issues scrutinized by regulators (e.g., awarding of contracts to firms owned by family members or unviable units supported by sister firms due to control-related reasons), we first rely on the size of internal trades among group affiliates. We also capture the potential tunneling incentives of controlling shareholders by whether the largest controlling shareholder and /or her immediate family members sit as inside executive directors. Last, we use the potential amount of settlement from pending litigation as a proxy for litigation threat. Combined, we predict that the value effect of PCODs is positively associated with the importance of internal trade among group affiliates, existence of inside directorship by controlling shareholders and the potential amount of settlement from pending litigation. Our findings are largely consistent with our predictions.
We further differentiate among PCODs. Specifically, we classify PCODs into four groupsregulator, politician, legal, and other backgrounds (media and social activist groups) and examine whether the value effect of different types of PCOD is more pronounced in the chosen conditioning variables. The results suggest that regulator PCODs have significant incremental value effect in all of three aforementioned circumstances -when 1) internal trade among affiliates is important, 2) controlling shareholder sits as an inside executive director, and 3) there is a larger potential amount of settlement from pending litigations.
While we provide evidence that PCODs could be beneficial under certain circumstances, in line with the literature on the benefits of politically connected boards, PCODs may suffer from weakened monitoring capabilities due to lack of professional expertise and firm-specific knowledge. As expected, we find that the number of PCODs in a firm is negatively correlated with pay-for-performance sensitivity for inside executive directors while we find no evidence that PCODs are associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review prior literature.
We provide institutional background on Chaebol firms and outside directors in Section III. In Section IV, we describe our sample and empirical measures, and present descriptive statistics.
The research design and empirical results of our study are the focus of Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes.
II. PRIOR LITERATURE
Benefits of political connection can take various forms including preferential treatments in taxation/tariffs, regulatory favor and oversight, winning lucrative government contracts, establishing entry/exit barrier, and opening doors abroad (Faccio 2006; Goldman et al. 2009 Goldman et al. , 2011 . Hillman et al. (1999) and Faccio (2006) find that investors react positively when a company CEO or board member has received a political appointment. Moreover, companies with political connections have lower taxes and greater market power while they exhibit lower return on assets and lower market to book ratios (Faccio 2010) . Firms with politicians on the board are also associated with better market based performance such as market capitalization and Tobin's q (Hillman 2005) . Furthermore, previous studies report that political connection affects a firm's financial reporting quality. Politically connected firms are more likely to make an accounting choice to hide true costs of political connections. Hence, accounting quality of politically connected firms is relatively poorer than non-connected firms (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Boubakri et al. 2008 ). However, this low accounting quality does not necessarily lead to high cost of debt, despite (other) non-politically connected firms with low quality facing high cost of debt, because politicians may provide protection from penalties for low accounting quality (Chaney et al. 2011) . Since political connection generates certain costs, however, a net effect of political connections on corporate value will depend on the magnitude of the marginal benefits and marginal costs of political connection (Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Faccio 2006) .
A large body of prior research investigates the role of politically connected executives using data from Chinese listed firms. Fan et al. (2007) argue that because the Chinese government possesses the right to appoint the CEO of a listed company, political connection is necessary for a CEO to survive in China. This study documents poorer IPO initial returns, long-term post-IPO returns, and post-IPO earnings growth of political connected firms due to increased rent-seeking activities of the politically connected CEO. In addition, Chinese state-owned enterprises with strong political connections are more likely to list overseas for private benefits and thus their overseas performance is worse than that of non-connected firms (Hung et al. 2012) . On the other hand, Li et al. (2008) report a positive effect of political connections on firm performance using the sample of Chinese private firms. They show that political connections do help in obtaining loans from banks or other state institutions.
Overall, prior literature documents that political connections could be valuable. Yet political connection examined by most prior studies is restricted to the politician CEO himself or a politician's close relative holding a position as a large shareholder or a top executive, in other words, politically connected managers (Faccio 2006; Faccio 2010) . Moreover, prior studies based on Chinese data mainly focused on only one dimension of political connections, namely whether the CEO or the Chairman has a Communist party membership.
In our review of the literature on political connection, we raise two issues. First, we argue that prior research's exclusive focus on connections to political parties is too narrow. Political connections should be broadly defined in the dynamic business environment. Second, we note that evidence of the value effect of PCODs is scant and we know little about whether PCODs add value to a firm, and if they do, under which circumstances they do so. (2015) by providing more direct mechanisms through which PCODs could add value above and beyond firms' ownership structure.
III. RESEARCH SETTING

Overview of Korean Chaebol Firms
Large business groups where controlling shareholders exert control over all group affiliates through indirect pyramidal and circular ownership structure are common in many countries including Korea (La Porta et al. 1999; Almeida et al. 2011) . Korean economic activity has been dominated by large conglomerate organizations known as Chaebol (Larcker and Tayan 2011).
There is a large body of literature on the causes and consequences of Korean business groups (Chaebol), (Claessens et al. 2000; Joh 2003; Baek et al. 2006; Almeida et al. 2011; Byun et al. 2013 ).
One stream of literature focuses on the negative effect of Chaebol firms. The agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, also known as tunneling, has been widely discussed as one of major concerns about Chaebol firms. Through pyramidal and circular ownership in Chaebol firms, controlling shareholders can easily influence decision making processes of their business groups and have incentives to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. For example, tunneling activities which transfer wealth from one firm to another firm within a business group are used to maximize controlling shareholder's wealth, although this could be detrimental to minority shareholders' wealth or decrease firm value. Also, Chaebol firms tend to pursue empire building to magnify private benefits of controlling shareholders (Bertrand et al. 2002; Cheung et al. 2006; Kim 2008; Jian and Wong 2010) .For these reasons, Chaebol firms are associated with inefficiency in internal capital markets, low profitability and poor financial reporting quality (Fan and Wong 2002; Joh 2003) .
Moreover, Chaebol firms with higher divergence between cash flow rights (represented by ownership levels) and voting rights (captured by the largest shareholder's control) engage in more earnings management (Kim 2008; Kim and Yi 2006; Choi et al. 2013) . Overall, extant research on Korean Chaebol firms are consistent with the findings of Fan and Wong (2005) using broader sample firms of East Asian countries. They find that as the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights increases, the largest shareholder's wealth is less likely to be aligned with that of the company, which provides controlling shareholders with greater incentives to expropriate minority shareholders' wealth.
On the other hand, recent literature pays attention to a positive effect of Chaebol firms. Firms within the conglomerate group can share their successful management knowledge with each other and raise investment funds more easily due to a cross payment guarantee (Siegel and Choudhury 2012) . Cooperation among business-group-affiliated firms results in lower cost of debt, which is consistent with the "co-insurance" argument (Byun et al. 2013) Collectively, this line of research emphasizes the advantage of vertical integration and efficient decision making in Chaebol firms.
Role of Korean Government in Governance Reform
Since the Asian financial crisis, where eight Chaebols went bankrupt in 1997 alone, the Korean government has issued a series of reforms granting greater rights to minority shareholders. One (of these reforms) was a requirement of outside directors to boost board independence (Black and Kim 2012) . Outside directors play a key role in monitoring managers' activities and protecting minority shareholders' interests (Fama and Jensen 1983) . They also have strong motivation to manage their reputation as an expert on effective monitoring (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996) . In addition, outside directors are expected to advise better with their professional knowledge and business experience. Korean government has been also very active in disciplining rent-seeking by Chaebol heads.
The Fair Trade Commission, an official watchdog, in collaboration with the prosecutor's office, has diligently investigated Chaebol firms' alleged embezzlement and breach of duty. In fact, many Chaebol heads such as SK, CJ, and Hanhwa were recently (in 2013 and 2014) fined and imprisoned for unfair intercompany transactions (e.g., awarding contracts to firms owned by family members), tax evasion, accounting fraud, and exploiting company assets for the benefit of family members.
Politically Connected Outside Directors in Korean Chaebol Firms
We focus on outside directors who are politically connected in Chaebol firms. Compared to politically connected managers, PCODs have received relatively little attention from academics.
In our full sample, we classify a board member as a PCOD if he/she is a current or former judge, prosecutor, government official, politician, journalist, or social activist.
On one hand, PCODs could have a positive effect on the firm . As their political influence has been built through valuable professional networks, relevant experience and specific knowledge in their field, it is likely that PCODs are experts that are valuable resources for a firm's success. For example, the governments is a critical source of dependency for firms (Lester el al. 2008 ). In addition, PCODs may have a relationship with controlling shareholders.
Therefore, they have a strong incentive to monitor professional managers' activities that exploit firm's resources for the manager's own benefit while sacrificing the controlling owner's wealth.
Furthermore, PCODs such as former government officials may have easier access to changes in various regulatory requirements that would have a substantial effect on firm value. They could provide valuable advice and counsel on public policy, as well as serve as communication channels to existing government officials (Lester et al. 2008) . They also help firms secure lucrative government contracts. In fact, Cho and Joh (2014) document that politically connected managers in Korean firms are more likely to win larger government contracts.
Based on anecdotal evidence, PCODs could be said to play an additional role as protection (against certain external risks). Korean Chaebol firms are more likely to appoint PCODs because they expect PCODs will protect them from certain risks, i.e. litigation from rivals or minority shareholders, formal investigation from the government such as the Fair Trade Commission, tax audit by Korean IRS, etc.
Chaebol firms have both the sufficient resources to appoint PCODs and the strong demand for PCODs' protection role. In Chaebol Firms, the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders becomes more severe (Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis 2000) . As previously mentioned, the Korean government is creating a unique corporate governance environment by actively disciplining Chaebols on rent-seeking owners. Furthermore,
shareholder activist groups such as Solidarity for Economic Reform initiate class action lawsuits against controlling owners for expropriating minority shareholders. Such government investigations or litigations could pose a serious threat to controlling shareholders. We expect that these all of these threats should translate into a strong demand for the PCODs' protective role for Chaebol firms. Indeed, business press has often criticized Korean Chaebol firms for appointing former government officials as outside directors.
Nonetheless, we expect PCODs to have a negative effect on firm performance. While
PCODs are valuable for aforementioned reasons, monitoring role of PCODs could be relatively weak due to lack of relevant professional knowledge and business experience. Aware of their purpose on the board, PCODs are unlikely to challenge Chaebol heads' decisions and may simply want to enjoy a quiet life. If this is the case, PCODs may not contribute to board effectiveness (such as monitoring or advisory role), which could offset potential benefits from adding PCODs to boards.
Due to countervailing theoretical predictions, the association between PCODs and firm value remains an empirical question. In addition, the incremental value of PCODs significantly differs according to each PCOD's human and social capital as resource dependence theory predicts (Lester et al. 2008) . Consequently, our focus is to examine the circumstances under which the value effect of PCODs is more or less pronounced rather than document that there is unambiguous evidence of a positive value effect of PCODs on average. By doing so, we can shed light on factors that make PCODs more or less attractive than non-PCODs (Lester et al.
2008; Wang 2015).
IV. SAMPLE AND VARIABLES
Sample
We restrict our sample to non-financial Korean Chaebol firms which are closely monitored by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC). Financial statement data and stock returns are obtained from the Korea Investor Service's database (KIS-VALUE) 3 . We drop firms with missing financial data or negative book values of equity. After imposing these data restrictions, we obtain a final sample of 1,480 firm-year observations. To reduce the effect of outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Variables
Politically Connected Outside Directors
While prior studies have examined the role of accounting/finance experts on boards (e.g., Defond et al. 2005 ; Krishinan and Visvanathan 2008), we focus our attention on PCODs. In our analysis, #PCOD represents the number of outside directors who are politically connected.
Following prior research , #Accfin is the number of outside directors who are accounting or finance experts (i.e. a current or former certified public accountant, or accounting or finance professor) and #Indexp is the number of outside directors not included in PCOD or Accfin, most of whom are academics and industry experts (for example, academics in business, science, medicine, and engineering and former or current CEO of other firms). 
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A in Table 1 PCODs. Furthermore, firms with PCODs are significantly larger (Size) and more highly leveraged (Leverage) than firms without PCODs. In addition, firms appointing PCODs have a larger board (Board_Size), a more independent board (Board_Independence) and a higher foreign ownership percentage (Foreign_Ownership). Firms with PCODs tend to be older (Firm_Age), and exhibit higher market to book ratio (Mtb), and report a higher proportion of research and development expenditure to total sales (Rd) than firms without PCODs. We also note that the average pay of outside directors (OD_Pay) is higher in firms with PCODs than in firms without PCODs (OD_Pay). 7 We include these firm characteristics in our regression models to control for their effect on firm performance.
[INSERT In Korea, total and average outside director pay are disclosed through board of director pay disclosures. Because the disclosure rules in Korea do not mandate but only recommend that firms distinguish between inside executive directors and outside non-executive directors when reporting the average pay of directors, many firms purposely mix the compensation of inside directors and that of outside directors to manage reported "average" director pay downward. In these cases, we are unable to distinguish between average inside and outside director pay. Hence, the number of observations for Exec_Pay and Od_Pay in Table 1 is much smaller than 1,480. See Hyun et al. (2014) for the details of the Korean firms' strategic executive pay disclosure.
V. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Economic Consequences of Appointing Politically Connected Outside Directors
Based on prior research on the determinants of board structure (Linck et al. 2008 Equations (1a) and (1b), we empirically test the effect of a firm's decision to appoint PCODs on firm performance. If the coefficients of main explanatory variables (  ) are positive (negative) in both Equations, it will indicate that PCOD has a positive (negative) effect on firm performance after controlling for other firm characteristics as well as year and industry fixed effects. All regressions in this section are estimated with Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm to control for both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Rogers 1993 Regarding the sign and significance of control variables, we find that firms with frequent board meetings (ln(Board_Meet)) tend to have lower Tobin_Q, consistent with prior literature that boards in underperforming firms meet more frequently (Vafeas 1999) . Also, the higher foreign ownership, the more likely the firm performs better (Chhibber and Majumdar 1999; Douma et al. 2006) . Moreover, performance is lower in older firms (ln(Firm_Age)) (Agarwal and Gort 1996; Agarwal and Gort 2002) .
[INSERT 
In 
In Equation (3a), the dependent variable in regression for CEO turnover is Ceo_Turnover which takes on the value of 1 if the firm replaces its CEO during the year, and 0 otherwise.
Thekey explanatory variables are Ret, Roa and their interaction term with ln(#PCOD).
We expect   and   to be negative and   and   to be positive, which suggests that boards with PCODs are less likely to replace their CEOs following poor performance. Following Shin et al. (2015) , in Equations (3b) and (3c), we measure the natural logarithm of average annual pay (salary, bonus, and stock options) of inside executive directors (Exec_Pay) as the dependent variable 11 for a level specification and change in the natural logarithm of executive pay (ΔExec_Pay) for a change specification. First, we expect positive   in Equation (3b), consistent with executives in firms with PCODs being more highly paid. Next, we expect the negative coefficients for the interaction terms between ln(#PCOD) and firm performance measures (Ret and Roa) in Equation (3c), suggesting that firms with PCODs exhibit lower pay-for-performance sensitivity than firms without PCODs.
Column (1) in Table 5 reports whether PCODs are associated with lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance. Contrary to our expectation, the coefficients on the interaction terms, ΔRoa*ln(#PCOD) and Ret*ln(#PCOD) are insignificant. We, however, note that the coefficients on both ΔRoa and Ret are also insignificant, suggesting that CEO turnover in Korean Chaebol firms is not significantly correlated with firm performance perhaps due to controlling owners' strong influence on CEO turnover decision. Taken together, these findings cast doubt on whether CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is a good setting for us to examine boards' monitoring ability.
Next, Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 show the results of PCODs' effect on executive compensation. We find a positive relation between the number of PCOD and executive pay in Column (2) after controlling for standard economic and governance determinants of CEO pay (e.g., Core et al. 1999) . A negative coefficient of Ret*ln(#PCOD) in Column (3) suggests that a higher number of PCODs is associated with lower executive pay-for-performance sensitivity. We, 11 See the footnote 4.
however, find no evidence of lower executive pay-for-performance sensitivity regarding accounting performance (Roa). Overall, we find some evidence supporting that boards' monitoring ability may suffer when firms add more PCODs to the board.
[
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Robustness Tests
Prior studies on the performance consequences of board structure stress the importance of addressing endogeneity issues since the board structure is largely a firm's choice variable (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach 2003) . If some of the unobserved determinants of firm performance are also determinants of a firm's decision to appoint PCODs, then PCODs might spuriously appear to affect firm performance. Another alternative explanation for PCODs leading to higher firm performance is that outperforming firms tend to appoint highly capable outside directors with human and social capital, such as PCODs. In order to mitigate this endogeneity concern, we use two econometric approaches. First, we estimate firm fixed-effects regressions, which control for unobservable time-invariant firm-specific factors correlated with both firm performance and the appointment of PCODs. Panel A of Table 6 presents the estimation results using firm fixedeffects regression. After including firm fixed-effects, we confirm that firms with PCODs exhibit higher Tobin's Q but we fail to find evidence supporting that firms with PCODs exhibit higher ROA.
Second, we utilize a propensity score matched pair research design (PSM) to rule out the possibility that different firm characteristics between firms with PCODs (we refer to these firms as "treatment firms") and without PCODs drive our results (Rosenbaum 2002) . Our propensity score matched pair research design requires a model for the conditional probability of appointing PCODs (or no PCODs) given economic and governance characteristics. We thus begin our tests by modeling a firm's decision to appoint PCODs through a logit regression. Next, we estimate propensity scores for each firm-year using predicted probabilities from the logit model. After estimating the conditional probability that a firm appoints PCODs, we match each firm with
PCODs with a firm having a similar probability of appointing PCODs, but in fact that does not appoint PCODs. 12 Finally, we analyze the impact of D_PCOD on firm performance. Panel B of Table 6 provides the estimation result using PSM. Appendix B shows the result in estimating a logit model used to find propensity scores. We find that larger firms with a larger board, higher divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights, and less volatility are more likely to appoint PCODs. In particular, divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights (Wedge) are used to proxy for the degree of entrenchment and incentive alignment effects (Morck et al. 1988; Fan and Wong 2005) . Higher divergence between controlling shareholders' voting rights and cash flow rights can capture the severity of agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. A positive association between Wedge and ln(#PCOD) suggests that firms with greater agency problems have higher demand for PCODs, potentially to protect controlling shareholder's interests .
Panel B of Table 6 suggests that firms with at least one PCOD are more likely to exhibit higher firm performance after controlling for difference in firm characteristics between firms with PCODs and without PCODs. Overall, we confirm that our results are robust to controlling for the endogenous nature of appointing PCODs.
[ INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine the value of politically connected outside directors in Korea. To shed light on the debate surrounding the value of appointing PCODs, we manually collect and construct a large sample of PCODs in Korean Chaebol firms.
Broadly consistent with Goldman et al. (2009), we find some evidence that the number of PCODs are positively correlated with firm performance, proxied by Tobin's Q and ROA. We also find that firms with at least one PCOD exhibit a significantly higher ROA. Next, we find that the value effect of PCODs increases with the importance of internal trade among group affiliates, the existence of inside directorship by controlling shareholders and a potential amount of settlement from pending litigation. We further differentiate among PCODs and find that regulator PCODs drive a significant proportion of value effect of PCODs under the three circumstances. On the other hand, we find evidence of weak monitoring ability of PCODs, in which the number of PCODs in a firm is negatively correlated with pay-for-performance sensitivity for inside executive directors. We find no evidence that PCODs are associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, using a unique setting where Korean Chaebol firms may have higher private benefits of control by controlling shareholders and face active government involvement in curbing controlling shareholders' rent extraction, we examine the role and effects of PCODs and find evidence of the PCOD's value enhancing effect.
Second, we expand the concept of political connection by analyzing outside directors' human and social capital based on the resource dependence theory perspective. Our attempt complements prior research's exclusive focus on connections of large shareholders or top executives to political parties and is more comprehensive in illustrating the firm's dynamic business environment. Third, we document economic factors influencing the effectiveness of PCODs and thus shed light on factors that make PCODs more or less attractive than non PCODs 
APPENDIX A Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Board_Size = Board size, which is the sum of inside, outside, and part-time directors (if any); Board_Independence = Board independence, which is the number of outside directors divided by the number of the entire board members (Board_Size); #Board_Id = The sum of the number of inside directors and part-time directors (if any); #Board_Od = The number of outside directors; #PCOD = The number of outside director who is a former judge, prosecutor, officer of government, politician, journalist, or social activist; #Accfin = The number of outside director who is Accfin (a current of former certified public accountant, accounting or finance professor); #Indexp = The number of outside director who is not included in PCOD or Accfin; PCOD_Ratio = The number of outside director who is PCOD (a former judge, prosecutor, officer of government, politician, journalist, or social activist) divided by total number of outside directors (Board_Od); PCOD_Ratio2 = The number of outside director who is PCOD (a former judge, prosecutor, officer of government, politician, journalist, or social activist) divided by board size (Board_Size); D_PCOD = 1 if firm has at least one PCOD (a former judge, prosecutor, officer of government, politician, journalist, or social activist), and 0 otherwise; #Regulator = The number of outside director who is a former officer of government; #Legal = The number of outside director who is a former judge or prosecutor; #Politician = The number of outside director who is a former politician; #OtherPCOD = The number of outside director who is a former journalist or social activist; Regulator_Ratio = The number of outside director who is a former officer of government divided by total number of outside directors (Board_Od); Legal_Ratio = The number of outside director who is a former judge or prosecutor divided by total number of outside directors (Board_Od); Politician_Ratio = The number of outside director who is a former politician divided by total number of outside directors (Board_Od); OtherPCOD_Ratio = The number of outside director who is a former journalist, or social activist divided by total number of outside directors (Board_Od); Board_Meet = The number of board meetings; Internal_Q = 1 if the sum of revenues and expenses from internal trades between affiliates belonging to a Chaebol divided by total sales belongs to the top quintile, and 0 otherwise; Controlling_Owner = 1 if the largest controlling shareholder and/or her immediate family member is an inside executive director, and 0 otherwise; Sue = The amount of money that firms are sued for divided by total sales; Foreign_Ownership = Foreign ownership; Wedge = Divergence between controlling shareholders' voting right and cashflow right; Tobin_Q = The ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets; Ret = Monthly compounded annual stock returns; Roa = Profit from continued operations (net income minus income from discontinued operations) divided by beginning-of-the-year total assets; Ocf = Operating cash flow divided by beginning-of-the-year total assets; Volatility = Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over prior 60 months, calculated when data are available for at least 24 months during prior five years; Size = Natural logarithm of total assets; Leverage = Total debt divided by total assets; Mtb = Market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Firm_Age = Number of years since the date of firm incorporation; Sales_Growth = Sales growth that changes in sales divided by lagged-year sales; Rd = Research and development expenditures divided by total sales; Ceo_Turnover = 1 if the firm replaces its CEO during the year, and 0 otherwise; Exec_Pay = Average annual pay (salary, bonus, and stock options) of inside executive director; Od_Pay = Average annual pay of outside director; and ΔExec_Pay = Changes in average annual pay (salary, bonus, and stock options) of inside executive director. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm. To mitigate any undue influence from outliers all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentile. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels for two-tailed z-tests, respectively. The dependent variable D_PCOD is 1 if firm retain at least one PCOD, 0 otherwise. T-statistics are reported in parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm. To mitigate any undue influence from outliers all variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentile. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests, respectively. Column (1) reports logit regression of performance -CEO turnover sensitivity. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses under each estimated coefficient. In Columns (2) to (4), t-statistics are reported in parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm in all Columns. To mitigate any undue influence from outliers all variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentile. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm. To mitigate any undue influence from outliers all variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentile. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests, respectively. Panel B reports the result using Propensity Matching analysis. The logit model used to find the propensity scores is shown in Appendix B.
APPENDIX B Logit Model used to find Propensity Scores
